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BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON NIGHTCLUB 
ILLEGALITY TO THE NEVADA GAMING 
CONTROL BOARD AND NEVADA’S 
COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS 
Robert Loftus 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Dana’s life is enviable. Take her job for example. Dana’s job is at a 
popular Las Vegas nightclub where Dana was chosen from hundreds of 
applicants and is able to walk home with a car payment’s worth of tips on a 
nightly basis.1 However, in its grandeur, Dana’s job does have a dark side; a 
side that pits her job security against doing the right thing. Specifically, Dana 
routinely witnesses her employer engage in criminal conduct—the lucrative 
solicitation and distribution of drugs and prostitution—and, thus, wishes that 
she could do something to prevent it. Dana, though, conscious that she is 
expendable because there are hundreds of individuals desperately waiting for 
her job, is scared that she will lose her at-will job if she takes any action against 
her employer’s criminal conduct. This scenario unfortunately occurs often in 
the Las Vegas nightclub industry and consequently puts nightclub employees in 
a precarious position because of Nevada’s underdeveloped retaliation laws in 
the nightclub industry. 
A. Brief Overview 
Although employees are generally knowledgeable that there are certain 
protections afforded under federal statutes such as the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”), in addition to state statutory protections such as Nevada’s 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“NVOSHA”), employees, as well as 
practitioners, find themselves unfamiliar with how to properly effectuate 
private sector whistleblower protections under the umbrella of Nevada’s 
                                                          
1 See Monica Kim, A Day in the Life of a Vegas Cocktail Waitress, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/conde-nast-
traveler/a-day-in-the-life-of-a-ve_b_3790194.html. 
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gaming industry. 
The general rule in employment law is that employers may fire their 
employees at any time—for any reason or no reason at all—under what is 
known as the at-will employment doctrine.2  However, in the past half-century, 
many exceptions to the general rule have emerged.3 For example, 
whistleblower protections, one form of retaliation protection laws, typically 
originate from two sources: (1) legislatures (federal and state), which enact 
statutory protections, or (1) courts, which modify and make common law 
protections.4 
Statutory protections, both federal and state, tend to be specific, addressing 
certain subject areas.5 Typically, statutory protections covering retaliation 
against whistleblowing arise when employees participate in protected activities 
(usually filing a complaint or testifying) under laws in the following areas: 
“compensation, discrimination, lie detectors, and occupational safety and 
health.”6 Yet, as with other areas of law, legislators often lack the foresight to 
address every possible variable in a retaliatory situation. 
“Common law protections, on the other hand, tend to ‘fill the gaps’ where 
no statute exists for a given situation.”7  Indeed, though, even Nevada’s 
common law protections fail to properly provide nightclub employees notice of 
when whistleblower protections are triggered because of Nevada’s 
underdeveloped retaliation laws. 
Specifically, in Nevada, an employer may not discharge an employee for a 
reason that violates an established public policy of Nevada.8  Nevada’s 
common law “distinguishe[s] between cases in which an employee is asked by 
[her] employer to participate in conduct [that violates] public policy (refusal 
case[s]) and those [cases] in which the employee merely discovers that [her] 
employer is engaged in illegal conduct and reports” her employer’s conduct 
that violates public policy (whistleblower cases).9 However, like Dana 
mentioned above, an employee cannot receive whistleblower protection by 
simply reporting to just anyone.  In fact, it is imperative for employees like 
                                                          
2 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND 
MATERIALS 910 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
3 Id. at 31. 
4 Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending A More 
Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1633, 1638 (2008). 
5 See id. 
6 Your Rights Filing a Whistleblower or Retaliation Claim – Nevada, WORKPLACE 
FAIRNESS (2016), http://www.workplacefairness.org/whistleblower-retaliation- 
claim-NV [hereinafter Workplace Rights]. 
7 Id. 
8 Vancheri v. GNLV Corp., 777 P.2d 366, 369 (Nev. 1989); see also Allum v. 
Valley Bank of Nev., 970 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Nev. 1998). 
9 Martin v. Papillon Airways, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164–65 (D. Nev. 2011), 
as amended (Feb. 1, 2012). 
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Dana, in order to receive protection under Nevada’s common law, to report 
their employer’s criminal conduct to a proper outside authority.10 
Hence, the question becomes, who or what qualifies as a proper outside 
authority for Dana to receive protection; because if Dana reports her 
employer’s illegal conduct to an organization that Nevada courts do not 
consider a proper outside authority, Dana will have jeopardized, if not thrown 
away, her highly prized job in pursuit of upholding Nevada’s public policies. 
Unfortunately, although the nightclub industry has expanded exponentially 
in Nevada to become a significant revenue generator for casinos and, 
consequently, supplies jobs to thousands of Nevadans, Nevada’s case law lacks 
precedent to inform nightclub employees, like Dana, as to which outside 
authorities would qualify under common law whistleblower protections.  
Specifically, for the purposes of this article, the issue is whether a nightclub 
employee is protected under Nevada’s common law whistleblower protections 
if the employee reports her employer’s conduct that violates Nevada’s public 
policy to the Nevada Gaming Control Board (“Board”), an outside regulatory 
authority. 
The problem is that 1) nightclub jobs are unique in the aspect that the 
employers are often third party vendors of casinos and, therefore, maintain 
some autonomy from the casino, and 2) nightclubs tend to lack gaming within 
the nightclub venue that would directly subject the nightclub to the Board’s 
governance.11 However, the Nevada Legislature has endowed the Board with 
broad reaching powers to protect the general welfare of Nevada through the 
oversight of casinos and the operations conducted on casino property.12 Thus, 
with its broad powers, the Board has, within the last six years, started holding 
casinos individually responsible for illegal conduct that has transpired within a 
nightclub that is located on a casino’s premises and has, correspondingly, 
issued fines to both the nightclub and casino.13 
As such, the Board’s enforcement conduct, coupled with its formal 
announcements, signals that nightclub employers, as third party vendors 
operating out of casinos, are beholden to the gaming laws and regulations 
promulgated by Nevada’s Legislature and executive agencies and, thus, are 
subject to the Board’s investigative and enforcement arms.14 Yet, in the face of 
such integrated business relationships between casinos and nightclubs, and the 
Board’s regulation of the illegal activities transpiring within casino nightclubs, 
Nevada’s case law is not clear on whether an employee of a non-gaming third 
                                                          
10 See Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 1989). 
11 Glenn Light et al., Keeping Compliance in Check, CASINO ENTERPRISE MGMT. 
12 (November 2009), http://www.lrrlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/LightRut 
Sing_1109.pdf. 
12 See infra Part II.C.2. 
13 See infra Part II.C.3. 
14 Id.; see also infra Part II.C.2. 
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party vendor, such as a nightclub, would be protected by whistleblower 
protections if the employee reported her employer’s illegal conduct to the 
Board. 
Accordingly, this article will briefly discuss the at-will doctrine and the 
general development of whistleblower protections. Thereafter, this article will 
focus specifically on Nevada’s common law whistleblower protections and 
analyze its underlying public policy exception. Ultimately, though, as the 
extremely profitable nightclub industry continues to operate and grow as third 
party vendors of casinos, this article will position the argument that an 
employee of a nightclub that is operating in a casino, regardless of whether the 
nightclub is owned directly by a casino or operates as an independent non-
gaming entity, who reports her employer’s criminal conduct to the Board 
should receive whistleblowing protections under Nevada’s common law 
protections. 
II. DISCUSSION 
As prefaced above, this article addresses Nevada’s common law 
whistleblower protections in the face of the rapidly changing casino and 
gaming industry.  Both Nevada and Las Vegas have traditionally been known 
as the gaming capital of the world; however, as of recently, Las Vegas has 
reinvented itself in light of declining gaming revenue as a premier nightclub 
destination—essentially creating an economic entertainment powerhouse.15  To 
illustrate, as of 2013, Las Vegas was home to seven of the top ten revenue-
grossing nightclubs in the United States.16  These clubs can independently gross 
upwards to $90 million annually in revenue while only operating two to three 
nights a week.17 Thus, with money flowing in hand over fist, nightclubs are a 
lightning rod for employment prospects as these nightclubs offer quick money 
for employees in the form of tips that can range from hundreds to thousands of 
dollars on a nightly basis, which is in addition to an employee’s hourly 
wages.18 
Since its inception, the Board, concerned about the vibrancy of the gaming 
industry, and Nevada’s dependent economy, regulated the gaming related 
conduct of casinos.19  Thus, because of the Board’s oversight, casino 
                                                          
15 Associated Press, What Happened to the Roulette Tables? The $1,300 Bottles of 
Vodka and World-Famous DJs in Clubs the Size of Football Fields that Are 
Keeping Vegas Afloat as Gambling Declines, DAILY MAIL (May 6, 2013, 9:42 
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2320061/Las-Vegas-Inside-night 
clubs-size-football-fields-Sin-City-afloat-gambling-declines.html [hereinafter Daily 
Mail Nightclub Article]. 
16 Top 100, NIGHTCLUB & BAR (2013), http://www.nightclub.com/top-100/2013-
nightclub-bar-top-100-list. 
17 Id. 
18 Kim, supra note 1. 
19 See generally Lou Dorn, Casino Liability for Third Party Operations, NEV. 
LOFTUS FINAL FOR PRINT  (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2016  4:21 PM 
252 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:248 
employees were able to report their employer’s illegal activities without fear of 
reprise under Nevada’s whistleblower protections.20  However, with the instant 
success of Las Vegas’ rebranding into a nightclub destination, the question 
looms as to whether an employee of a nightclub, which is integrated with a 
casino, is protected by Nevada’s common law whistleblower protections if the 
employee reports the illegal conduct of the nightclub to the Board. 
A. At-Will Employment in Nevada 
In Nevada, like most states, an employer generally has the liberty to fire an 
at-will employee for any reason or for no reason at all.21 More articulately 
defined, at-will employment means that an employer may terminate an 
employee at any time for any reason, except an illegal one, or for no reason at 
all without incurring legal liability.22 Likewise, at-will employees are free to 
leave their employer at any time, with exceptions such as fulfilling contractual 
obligations, for any reason, or no reason at all, without legal ramifications.23 
This definition of the at-will relationship, in its simple form, demonstrates one 
of the strongest benefits to both employer and employee: the freedom of 
choice.24 Essentially, at-will employment allows an employer the freedom to 
choose which employees it believes are most beneficial to its enterprise and, 
similarly, allows employees freedom to choose the job that most closely aligns 
with their personal, unique situations. However, as briefly touched upon, there 
are exceptions to at-will employment. 
1. Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine 
Over the years, through the development of statutory and common-law 
protections, courts have carved exceptions to the at-will doctrine in recognition 
of the importance of protecting an employee’s livelihood from unjust 
termination.25 Statutory protections focus mostly on acts of the employer that 
                                                          
GAMING LAW. (Sept. 2012), http://nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/GamingLaw 
_2012_Third_Party_Operations.pdf. 
20 See generally Ron Dicker, Douglas A. Poppa, Former Riviera Casino Worker, 
Fired for Reporting Rigged Game, Lawsuit Claims, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jan. 16, 2013, 6:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/douglas-
poppa-riviera-casino-rigged-slot-machine-lawsuit_n_2480626.html; see also Nick 
Divito, Vegas Casino Rigged Game, Security Man Says, COURTHOUSE NEWS 
SERVICE (Jan. 15, 2013, 7:20 AM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2013/01/15 
/53919.htm. 
21 See Smith v. Cladianos, 752 P.2d 233, 234 (Nev. 1988). 
22 See ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, at 910. 
23 Id. 
24 See James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: Conscience and At-Will Employment, 9 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 235, 235 (2007). 
25 The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEG., 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-
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involve illegal discrimination or acts of retaliation.26  Common law exceptions, 
depending on the jurisdiction, will protect an employee if the employer violates 
an implied contract, does not act in good faith and fair dealing, or violates 
public policy.27 However, even as the protections afforded under statutory 
frameworks and the common law vary in scope, both statutory and common 
law exceptions to the at-will doctrine protect whistleblowers. 
2. Whistleblower Protections 
Whistleblowing, simply defined, is when an employee reports alleged or 
true wrongdoing within her organization, recognized in both the private and 
public sector, to internal or outside authorities.28 Thus, as employees are most 
knowledgeable about their workplace, they are not only in the best position to 
report such violations, but they are sometimes the only ones who report 
wrongdoing or illegal conduct.29 
i. Statutory Whistleblower Protections 
a. Federal Statutory Whistleblower Protections 
There are numerous federal statutes that protect against whistleblowing; 
however, the statutory protections are narrowly crafted and target specific areas 
of law.30  One example is the labor protections under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act. The Fair Labor Standards Act seeks to prohibit employers abuse or 
exploitation of employees by establishing substantive wage, hour, and overtime 
standards.31 Thus, an employee who makes a formal complaint specifically 
about her employer’s violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act is protected 
under statutory whistleblower protections.32 
b. Nevada’s Statutory Whistleblower Protections 
Like the federal whistleblower statutes, “the Nevada Legislature has 
                                                          
overview.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinafter At-Will Presumption and 
Exceptions]. 
26 See infra Part II.A.2.i.b. 
27 At-Will Presumption and Exceptions, supra note 25. 
28 Stefan Rützel, Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a Response to the 
Legal Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & 
TECH. J. 1, 1 (1995). 
29 Id. at 2. 
30 See generally Federal Whistleblower Protections, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR, 
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81
6&Itemid=129 (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
31 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333 
(2011); see generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C § 201 (2014). 
32 See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1333. 
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[crafted] narrow statutory protections for certain activities.”33  As previously 
stated, employees traditionally trigger statutory whistleblower protections when 
they “engage in protected activities (usually filing a complaint or testifying) 
under laws” designed to protect employees from retaliation.34 
Examples include protections afforded for claims pertaining to Nevada’s 
False Claims Act, wage and hour issues, and discrimination issues.35  For 
instance, under Nevada’s False Claims Act, whistleblowers are protected when 
they bring suit in the name of the state of Nevada where an individual engages 
in conduct that defrauds the government of taxpayer dollars.36 Similar to 
protections afforded under the Fair Labor Standards Act, in Nevada, an 
employee may not be discharged or penalized in retaliation for testifying in an 
investigation or proceeding that concerns the enforcement of Nevada’s 
compensation, wages, and hours laws.37  These laws cover such topics as 
minimum wage, overtime compensation requirements, and meal and rest 
periods.38 In regards to discriminatory practices, an employer may not 
discharge or discriminate against an employee in retaliation for opposing or 
reporting an employer’s unlawful discriminatory employment practice.39 
Accordingly, like federal statutory protections, Nevada’s statutory protections 
are triggered under specific circumstances. 
ii. Nevada’s Common Law Protections 
Like most states, in addition to statutory protections, Nevada also 
recognizes a common law public policy exception to at-will employment 
terminations.40  In Nevada, when an employer terminates an employee in 
violation of public policy, the terminated employee may bring a cause of action 
for the employer’s unlawful actions.41  Nevada courts deem such retaliatory 
terminations as tortious discharges and classify the cases as either refusal cases 
or whistleblower cases.42 The rationale behind these kinds of tort actions is that, 
although an employer is free to dismiss an at-will employee under almost any 
lawful circumstance, an employer is not entitled to dismiss an employee for a 
reason that contravenes public policy.43  However, the Nevada Supreme Court 
                                                          
33 Workplace Rights, supra note 6. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Washoe, 179 P.3d 
556, 559 (Nev. 2008); see also Nᴇᴠ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 357.250 (2015). 
37 See Nᴇᴠ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 608.015 (2015). 
38 See Nᴇᴠ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. §§ 608.250; 608.018; 608.019 (2015). 
39 See Nᴇᴠ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 613.340(1) (2015). 
40 Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 989 P.2d 882, 885 (Nev. 1999). 
41 Id. 
42 See Abbas v. Lucky Cab Co., No. 50904, 2009 WL 3191531, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 9, 
2009). 
43 See id. 
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narrowly construes this exception to the at-will doctrine.  In fact, since the first 
recognition of common law retaliation protections in Wiltsie v. Baby Grand 
Corp., the Nevada Supreme Court has created a judicial checklist that a 
Plaintiff must satisfy in order to receive retaliation protections in both refusal 
and whistleblower cases.44 
a. Refusal Cases 
As stated, there is a clear distinction under Nevada law between cases in 
which an employee is asked by her employer to participate in conduct violative 
of public policy and those in which the employee merely discovers that her 
employer is engaged in illegal conduct and reports it to someone.45 
In refusal cases, Nevada courts aim to protect employees who refuse to 
engage in their employer’s conduct that violates the state’s public policy.46 For 
example, an employer that requires its employee, who has an open surgical 
wound, to work near cyanide would run counter to the state’s policy of 
providing employees with a safe and healthy working environment.47 
Accordingly, to promote this policy, an employee must feel free to object when 
asked, for instance, to work in an unreasonably dangerous area without fear of 
retaliation from her employer.48 
Thus, under Nevada common law, in order to trigger retaliation protection 
in a refusal case, an employer must terminate an employee because the 
employee affirmatively objected to participating in her employer’s illegal 
conduct, an action in direct contradiction to public policy.49 
b. Whistleblowing 
The Nevada Supreme Court established Nevada’s basic common law 
retaliatory protection framework in Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp. and then 
building upon that framework, Nevada’s common law whistleblower 
protections emerged. 
 1. Wiltse v. Baby Grand Corp. 
In Wiltsie, a discharged employee brought a wrongful termination claim 
against his prior employer because the employer terminated the employee for 
reporting his supervisor’s illegal conduct.50  In analyzing Nevada’s common 
                                                          
44 See infra Part II.A.2.ii.b.1. 
45 See Abbas, 2009 WL 3191531 at *1. 
46 Martin v. Papillon Airways, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164 (D. Nev. 2011), as 
amended (Feb. 1, 2012). 
47 D’Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 213–16 (Nev. 1991). 
48 Id. at 216. 
49 Martin, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. 
50 Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 1989). 
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law whistleblower protections, the Nevada Supreme Court established the first 
prong, which is to find that “firing an at-will employee for reporting illegal 
conduct of his employer violates an established public policy of [Nevada].”51 
The court then established the second prong, which requires an employee to 
report illegal conduct to appropriate authorities and not merely act in a private 
or proprietary manner by reporting internally within the organization.52  
Unfortunately for the employee in Wiltsie, the Nevada Supreme Court found 
that although he was trying to advance Nevada’s public policy through the 
protection of Nevada’s gaming laws, he did not trigger whistleblower 
protection because he did not report his employer’s conduct to an outside 
authority.53 
 2. Public Policy 
The political branches of government usually define public policy.54 For 
example, “[w]hen a state’s legislature has enacted legislation that forbids 
certain conduct,” courts hold that participating in the forbidden “conduct is 
against public policy.”55 
“[In determining] what constitutes public policy . . . courts look to statutes 
and constitutional provisions to determine if a given practice has been endorsed 
(e.g. the right to collect workers’ compensation benefits) or prohibited (e.g. 
criminal laws prohibiting perjury).”56 So, as addressed above, if a Nevada 
statute endorses an employee’s right to minimum wages and overtime 
compensation, an employer who retaliates against an employee for invoking 
that right would be contravening public policy.57 “On the other side of the same 
coin, because criminal statutes prohibit perjury,” for example, “an employer 
who coerces an employee to commit perjury by threats of reprisal is also 
contravening Nevada’s public policy.”58 
 3. External Reporting with Intent to Disclose Illegal Conduct 
As stated, the Nevada Supreme Court “believe[s] that whistleblowing 
activities [that] serve[] a public purpose should be protected[,] [s]o long as [the 
whistleblower’s] actions are not merely private or proprietary, but instead” 
expose the employer to a proper external authority.59 Thus, Wiltsie is 
                                                          
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 433–34. 
54 Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984). 
55 See Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311, 313 (D. Nev. 1985). 
56 Workplace Rights, supra note 6; see e.g., Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687 
(Cal. 1992), overruled by Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co., 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998). 
57 See generally D’Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 21–18 (Nev. 1991). 
58 Workplace Rights, supra note 6. 
59 Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 1989). 
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illustrative in the fact that whistleblower protections are not triggered if an 
employee simply reports illegal conduct internally to a supervisor.60 
Under Ainsworth v. Newmont Min. Corp., the Nevada Supreme Court 
reaffirmed their stance that the employer’s illegal conduct must be reported to 
an outside government authority and also clarified that the individual seeking 
retaliation protection must have affirmatively sought to notify the external 
authority of its employer’s illegal conduct.61 In Ainsworth, the Nevada Supreme 
Court denied whistleblower protections because nothing in the evidentiary 
record indicated that the employee engaged in an affirmative action to expose 
her employer’s wrongful conduct outside of an ambiguous conversation with a 
governmental employee.62  “In fact, when asked in her deposition whether she 
‘ever filed a formal complaint of violation with any governmental authority 
while she was working for Newmont,’” Plaintiff answered in the negative.63  
Accordingly, “[t]he essence of the Wiltsie public policy exception is that the 
employee must take affirmative action and contact the appropriate authorities—
must blow the whistle—to ‘expose illegal or unsafe practices’.”64 
 4. Reporting to the Correct Authoritative Body 
The final hurdle to receive Nevada’s common law whistleblower 
protections involves reporting the employer’s illegal conduct to the correct 
external governmental body. This is an essential step, as the United States 
District Court for the District of Nevada has held that reporting to just any 
external governmental body does not trigger Nevada’s whistleblower 
protections.65 
In Schlang v. Key Airlines, Inc., terminated airline pilots sued their 
employer for, among other causes of action, retaliatory discharge in violation of 
Nevada public policy.66  The employees argued that they complied with Wiltsie 
because they reported their employer’s safety violations to the National 
Mediation Board, an external government agency that mediates disputes 
between employees and employers on issues such as rates of pay and working 
conditions.67  The court, in applying Nevada law, held that the employees 
presented nothing that would “indicate[] that, by any stretch of the imagination, 
the [National Mediation Board] is the ‘appropriate authority’ to report alleged 
                                                          
60 Id. at 433–34. 
61 Ainsworth v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 56250, 2012 WL 987222, at *2 (Nev. 
Mar. 20, 2012). 
62 Id. at *2–3. 
63 Id. at *2. 
64 Schlang v. Key Airlines, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 1493, 1504 (D. Nev. 1992) vacated 
in part, Schlang v. Key Airlines, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 666 (D. Nev. 1994). 
65 See id. at 1504. 
66 Id. at 1495. 
67 Id. at 1503–04. 
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safety violations.”68  Clearly, as the court positioned, the appropriate external 
authority charged with prosecuting those violations would have been the 
Federal Aviation Administration.69 Accordingly, the court did not grant 
whistleblower protections. 
 5. Possible External Authorities for Nightclub Employees 
Thus, at this point, the question must be raised again as to what appropriate 
external authority is charged with prosecuting illegal violations that transpire in 
Las Vegas nightclubs?  The typical illegal activities that transpire within 
nightclubs and day clubs involve the solicitation and distribution of narcotics 
and prostitution.70 
First, there is the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“Las Vegas 
Metro”).  Specifically, Las Vegas Metro’s “Narcotics Section is responsible for 
suppressing and investigating . . . drug-related crimes includ[ing], but [] not 
limited to, arresting and prosecuting individuals involved in major narcotic 
offenses; including trafficking, manufacturing, smuggling, and clandestine lab 
activities.”71  In addition, Las Vegas Metro’s Vice division is responsible for 
investigating vice-related crimes, including arresting and prosecuting 
prostitutes, their clients, and pandering suspects, prostitution-related larcenies, 
and businesses that front for prostitution.72 
Second, but less certain because of its lack of prosecutorial functions, there 
is the Nevada Department of Public Safety’s Investigation Division.  Through 
Nevada Revised Statutes 480.400 through 480.520 and 453.271, the Nevada 
Legislature mandated that the Nevada Department of Public Safety conduct 
controlled substance investigations and provide criminal investigative services 
to state, county and local law enforcement agencies upon request.73 The 
Department of Public Safety’s Investigation Division “collects, analyzes and 
disseminates information concerning organized crime, controlled substance 
violators, missing persons, unidentified bodies and domestic violence.”74 
Lastly, there is the Nevada Gaming Control Board.75  As the Nevada 
                                                          
68 Id. at 1504. 
69 Id. at 1505. 
70 See Howard Stutz, Las Vegas Hotel-Casino Operators Told to Stamp Out Illegal 
Activities, L.V. REV.-J. (Mar. 22, 2013, 2:03 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com 
/business/tourism/las-vegas-hotel-casino-operators-told-stamp-out-illegal-activities. 
71 Narcotics Section, L.V. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lvmpd.com/ 
Sections/Vice/tabid/449/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
72 Vice, L.V. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lvmpd.com/Sections/Vice 
/tabid/190/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
73 Overview of the DPS Investigation Division, NEV. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY - 
INVESTIGATION DIV., http://id.dps.nv.gov/about/Investigation_Division/  
(last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
74 Id. 
75 Where the Nevada Gaming Control Board would be an external authority in the 
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Supreme Court asserted in Wiltsie, “[n]o public policy is more basic than the 
enforcement of our gaming laws.”76 Thus, in 1955, the Nevada Legislature 
“created the [Board] within the Nevada Tax Commission, whose purpose was 
to inaugurate a policy to eliminate the undesirable elements in Nevada gaming 
and to provide regulations for the licensing and the operation of gaming.”77 
Specifically, the Board, organized under Nevada Revised Statute 463, serves as 
an administrative agency of the state of Nevada and is charged with the 
administration and enforcement of the gaming laws of the state.78 
Thus, with its broad reaching powers over the gaming industry and casino 
licensees, the Board has within the last six years began a regulatory campaign 
against the illegal conduct in both nightclubs owned by the casinos and 
nightclubs operating as third-party vendors located within casinos.79 However, 
before the Board’s regulation over nightclubs is addressed, and what 
implications that entails for whistleblower protections, it is important to take a 
cursory look at the development of the casino business model in Las Vegas. 
B. The Evolution of Las Vegas’ Casino Model 
“In 1941 the El Rancho Vegas resort opened on a section of U.S. 
[highway] just outside of [Las Vegas’] jurisdiction.”80 Thereafter, “other hotel-
casinos soon followed, and the section of highway became known as ‘the 
Strip.’”81 Then, twenty years later, precipitated by the acquisition of hotels by 
Howard Hughes, the Strip became the interest of corporate conglomerates.82 
Fast-forward yet again to the 1980s, Steve Wynn opened the Mirage, Las 
Vegas’ first mega-resort.83 Starting with the Mirage, “over the next two 
decades the strip was transformed yet again: Old casinos were dynamited to 
make room for massive complexes taking their aesthetic cues from ancient 
Rome and Egypt, Paris, Venice, New York and other glamorous escapes.”84 
With gaming tax rates up to 50% in some states, casinos can generate 
                                                          
context of addressing illegal violations that transpire in Las Vegas nightclubs that 
are housed within a gaming establishment, as contrasted against independent 
freestanding nightclubs that would not fall within the purview of the Nevada 
Gaming Control Board’s authority. 
76 Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 1989). 
77 About Us, NEV. GAMING CONTROL BOARD., http://gaming.nv.gov/index.aspx? 
page=2 (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
78 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 463 (2015). 
79 See infra Part II.C.3. 
80 Las Vegas, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/las-vegas/print (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2016). 
81 Id. 
82 See id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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hundreds of millions in state revenues.85 Accordingly, states are using casinos 
at an increased pace to generate government revenues to pay for schools, 
universities, transportation, and public safety.86  For example, “during fiscal 
year 2014, more than $2.0 billion in taxes and fees were paid by Nevada hotel-
casino operators. This included major contributions to Nevada’s three largest 
sources of revenue: sales tax, property tax and gaming tax.”87 “Nevada hotel 
casinos account for [more than] $1.4 billion, or approximately 45 percent of 
[s]tate [g]eneral [f]und [tax] revenues—more than any other industry.”88  Thus, 
it is no wonder why the Nevada Supreme Court asserted that “[n]o public 
policy is more basic than the enforcement of our gaming laws.89 
Because of gambling and the casino industry as a whole, Las Vegas has 
shown impressive job growth throughout the years and has developed into a 
major city player with a low tax burden on its citizens.90  In fact, “large tax 
contributions by the tourism and gaming industry allow Nevada’s residents and 
businesses to enjoy among the lowest tax burdens in the nation.”91  However, 
although gaming has played a major economic role in Las Vegas, the 
prominence of the Las Vegas gaming institution and its related benefits have 
shown signs that, going forward, Las Vegas cannot survive on gaming revenue 
alone. 
1. Gaming Decline 
In the 1990s, approximately 60 percent of a Las Vegas resorts’ revenue 
came from gambling.92  Thus, with the revenue that gaming generated for 
Nevada, it was important for the Board to help insure the image of Nevada’s 
gaming and casino industry for return and future visitors.  However, with the 
rise of Macau off the coast of China as the premier gambling location in the 
world, gambling locations opening around the United States, and the changing 
spending habits of millennials, as of 2013, gaming revenue for casinos fell just 
short of 37 percent.93  Tellingly, new casino projects announced are eschewing 
                                                          
85 Jackson Brainerd, 2015 Casino Tax and Expenditures, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEG. 
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce 
/casino-tax-and-expenditures-2013.aspx. 
86 Id. 
87 How Gaming Benefits Nevada, NEV. RESORT ASS’N, http://nevadaresorts.org 
/benefits/taxes.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
88 Id. 
89 Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 1989). 
90 See How Gaming Benefits Nevada, supra note 87. 
91 Id. 
92 Dave Berns & Cy Ryan, Gambling Makes Up Smallest Chunk Ever of Casino 
Revenue, VEGASINC (Jan. 6, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/ 
business/real-estate/2012/jan/06/shift-spending-gambling-continues-state-reports/. 
93 Daily Mail Nightclub Article, supra note 15; see Christopher Palmeri, Local 
Casinos Are a Losing Bet, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Apr. 3, 2014, 1:51 PM), 
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the traditional slot player base that built the modern Strip and are focusing on 
premium nightclubs, dining, and retail to attract the new Las Vegas tourist 
crowd.94 
2. Rise of the Money Machine, the Las Vegas Nightclub 
“In 1995, when the movie ‘Casino’ hit theaters, keeping gamblers playing 
was the cardinal rule in Las Vegas, but that’s no longer the case.”95 In the not 
too distant past, visitors enjoyed a nightclub that boasted booze, food, and basic 
lounge entertainment before such patrons headed off into the casino to spend 
their money.96 Now, visitors—products of the digital age—come to Las Vegas 
with pockets full of cash and plastic, ready to spends hundreds, if not 
thousands, of dollars on liquor and the chance to listen to famous DJs play at 
nightclubs, with spending money on gaming as a second thought.97  In fact, “it 
is now common for visitors to Las Vegas to skip gambling [altogether] and 
instead” spend their money on one of the many popular, and expensive, multi-
level nightclubs that feature “popular touring DJs and celebrities, lasers, high 
tech lighting, LED walls, and confetti cannons.”98 
Over the years, Las Vegas nightclubs evolved into mega-clubs.99  First, the 
Palms opened Rain in 2001 with 26,000 square feet.100 Thereafter, Caesar’s 
opened Pure in 2004 at 36,000 square feet, followed by XS with 40,000 square 
feet at the Encore, and then Marquee with 60,000 square feet at the 
Cosmopolitan.101  As these clubs continue to expand in size, their revenues also 
continue to expand northward.102  Shockingly, although these clubs are 
                                                          
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-04-03/casinos-close-as-revenue-falls-
in-gambling-saturated-u-dot-s (explaining the proliferation of new casinos opening 
outside of Nevada); see also When Gambling Isn’t a Sure Bet for Las Vegas, CBS 
NEWS (Jan. 1, 2015, 7:20 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/las-vegas-casinos-
reinventing-the-strip-to-attract-new-generation/ [hereinafter Gambling Isn’t a Sure 
Bet]. 
94 Hannah Dreier, Las Vegas Clubs Help Casinos Offset Declines in Gambling, 
Attract Younger Audience, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2013, 4:46 PM), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20141228215642/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/201
3/05/06/las-vegas-clubs-replace-casinos_n_3225061.html. 
95 Gambling Isn’t a Sure Bet, supra note 93. 
96 Tovin Lapan, Nightclubs Are the New Cash Registers at Strip Casinos, L.V. SUN 
(Mar. 28, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/mar/28/clubs-
increasingly-center-attention-strip/. 
97 Gambling Isn’t a Sure Bet, supra note 93; See generally Ashley Powers, Las 
Vegas Clubs Get Slapped for Bad Behavior, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2009), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/19/nation/na-vegas-clubs19. 
98 Las Vegas Scans - What’s New in Las Vegas, CASENET (July 6, 2015), 
http://casenet.com/concert/lvscan.htm. 
99 Lapan, supra note 96. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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typically open only two to three nights a week, they can generate up to $90 
million dollars in revenue annually.103 As Las Vegas visionary Steve Wynn 
observed when opening Encore, “money from gambling had been maybe ‘the 
best cash register in [casinos] until the clubs came along.’”104 
“The shift in revenue” away from gaming to clubs “began after the 1989 
opening of The Mirage and the property’s mix of non-gaming [entertainment 
and dining] offerings.”105 Then, in the 1990s Las Vegas experienced a 
construction boom that produced the opening of the MGM Grand, Bellagio, 
Venetian and Paris, among other mega-resorts and the introduction of high-end 
restaurants and nightclubs.106 
The most successful part of Las Vegas’ reinvented “image was the creation 
of super hip, sexy nightclubs.”107 Through the application of cutting edge 
entertainment, sex appeal, insanely expensive bar tabs, and successful 
marketing, Las Vegas created a brand that brought 20 and 30-somethings into 
town who were willing to drop hundreds of thousands of dollars to party in 
these over-the-top clubs to “[look] for love, or at least, love for one [] night,” as 
much they were to blow money at the casino tables.108  Successful casino 
operators understand that the divergent shift is “a sign in the change of tastes of 
the younger generation” that does not want to be the audience, rather they want 
be part of the show instead—the actors.109 
Thus, in the shadow of the last recession and steadily declining gaming 
revenue, casinos, through the promotion of these nightclubs, “have created a 
business model that has sustained investors even during” economic 
adversity.110  Casino management, skeptical at first about the shift of focus 
from gaming to nightclubs, couldn’t help but notice that the numbers showed 
that nightclubs “were making more money per square foot than gambling 
devices.”111  “During the heart of the recession, when overall Strip revenues 
tumbled by 16 percent, nightclubs saw more profit than ever”—becoming ever 
more important to the casinos’ bottom line.112  For example, “[h]alf of Steve 
Wynn’s profit comes from [his casinos’] nightclubs.”113  As a result, in order to 
                                                          
103 Kim, supra note 1; Dreier, supra note 94. 
104 Lapan, supra note 96. 
105 Berns & Ryan, supra note 92. 
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107 David Sheldon, Las Vegas Nightclubs Pose Dark Threat to Tourists Via 
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108 Id.; see Powers, supra note 97; 
109 Lapan, supra note 96. 
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112 Daily Mail Nightclub Article, supra note 15. 
113 Josh Eells, Night Club Royale, NEW YORKER (Sep. 30, 2013), 
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maximize casino revenue, casinos began “tearing out slot machines and felt 
table[] [games] in favor of nightclubs.”114 
3. Interdependence of Gaming and Nightclubs 
Clearly, these clubs, if operated correctly, are tremendous money magnets. 
Accordingly, through the use of “extravagantly paid DJs, larger-than-life 
venues, billboard ads that stretch beyond the Strip to Hollywood Boulevard and 
Miami” to attract the younger extravagant spenders into their clubs, casinos are 
trying to maximize their revenue by integrating their nightclubs into their 
gaming entertainment and dining facilities.115 
To capitalize on the clubs, casinos snake waiting queues past well-traveled 
areas—table games, slot machines, and restaurant corridors.116 Thus, because 
“club[s] may see 8,000 people come and go over the course of a night[,]” 
casinos create a lot of calculated foot traffic through their tempting slot 
machines and table games.117 Additionally, some casinos have placed table 
games inside the nightclubs to offer an all-around adult playground complete 
with drinks, gambling, and world renowned DJs.118 
Although nightclubs and non-gaming components, such as dining, are huge 
draws that bring in the customers, casinos cannot survive without gaming 
revenue. A prime example is the Cosmopolitan of Las Vegas that opened in 
2010.119 The Cosmopolitan focused on “stylish features, spacious rooms, 
signature restaurants”, and, of course, the mega-club.120 However, the 
Cosmopolitan short-changed the casino by limiting its table games and slot 
machine operations.121 As a result, “[t]he property hasn’t made much 
money.”122 Specifically, during its first year of operation, “[i]t lost $19.4 
million in the third quarter, following a $25.2 million loss in the second 
quarter.”123 
Ultimately, although gaming revenue is declining in Las Vegas, and 
nightclub revenue generates approximately 10–14 percent of overall casino 
revenue, casinos still take a very serious approach to providing customers with 
a high-level gaming platform.124 The casinos’ efforts going forward are to keep 
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Las Vegas relevant to both the millennial generation and the tenured visitors 
who still look forward to the chance to win big on the one-arm bandits.125 Thus, 
while casinos continue to push the envelope on creating the next mega-club, 
casinos are also trying to increase the odds that millennials will gamble by 
branding slot machines with popular TV and movie titles, and formatting video 
poker to look more like a video game.126 
As one casino executive succinctly stated, “a dollar is a dollar” and it 
doesn’t matter “if a customer comes for a weekend of gambling or if they’re 
doing other things, as long as they’re spending money.”127 Ultimately, in the 
midst of the grand nightclub party, news about expansive illegal conduct that 
was attracted to Las Vegas’ new casino business model caught the attention of 
the agency appointed to protect Nevada’s gaming image and Nevada’s 
dependent economy—Nevada’s Gaming Control Board.128 
4. Nightclubs Gone Wild 
Creating and managing a popular Las Vegas nightclub “requires the deft 
and daring skill of operating a party environment that almost crosses the line 
into illegal activity.”129 “Anything less would be considered too tame to 
generate a buzz.”130 However, with the rise of the lucrative nightclubs, casinos 
and nightclubs are turning a blind eye and even enabling illegal activity to 
occur in the nightclubs. In fact, authorities are witnessing, at an alarming rate, 
an increase in prostitution, narcotic crimes, human trafficking, and fatal 
shootings that are attached to these popular venues.131 With over fifty clubs 
operating in Las Vegas and new additions coming all the time, the issue has 
become intensified as the illegal conduct is spilling out of the nightclubs and 
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129 Liz Benston, Is the Party Over for Prive?, L.V. SUN (Jul. 29, 2009, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/jul/29/party-over-prive/. 
130 Id. 
131 Ashley Powers, Clubs Gone Wild: Vegas Tries to Rein in Anything-Goes 
Nightclubs, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 21, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-09-
21/news/0909210188_1_las-vegas-strip-pool-club-planet-hollywood; Powers, 
supra note 97; see also Tom Ragan, Nevada Movement Draws the Line on Human 
Trafficking, L.V. REV.-J. (May 29, 2013, 4:07 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com 
/news/las-vegas/nevada-movement-draws-line-human-trafficking (detailing human 
trafficking concerns in nightclubs); Francis McCabe, Man Indicted in Fatal 
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into the casinos.132 In the face of this growing issue, the Board became 
involved because the criminal activity began affecting the safety of nightclub 
employees, tourists, casinos, and the integrity of Nevada’s gaming industry as a 
whole.133 
C. Nevada Gaming Control Board Oversight 
1. The Board’s Crackdown 
The Board is normally known for regulating casinos on improper gaming 
conduct in its conventional form, such as failing to file some Internal Revenue 
Service currency transaction records, money laundering activities, or 
bookkeeping and slot machine accounting errors.134 However, with the ascent 
of the mega-clubs and their ever-increasing importance and interrelatedness to 
the revenue for casinos and the state of Nevada, the Board has focused on the 
conduct within nightclubs.135 
Even though nightclubs, restaurants, and other third-party vendors in 
casinos do not typically offer gambling, “the [Board] has the authority to 
regulate activities there because of a broad mandate to enforce the legitimacy 
and reputation of the gaming industry.”136 Accordingly, Board has levied 
millions of dollars in fines against various nightclubs and their related casinos 
in recent years.137 Indeed, to understand the Board’s authority, it is important to 
understand the relationship between the casinos and the nightclubs. 
2. Third-Party Vendors 
Prior to Las Vegas’ recent transformation, casinos, operating as “gaming 
licensees[,] commonly owned and operated all or most of their non-gaming 
venues.”138 Now, casinos are removing themselves from the ownership and 
operation of the non-gaming venues, including restaurants and nightclubs, and, 
in turn, allowing third party vendors to take the reins instead.139 This shift in the 
casinos’ operational model creates an interesting situation in terms of the 
Board’s regulatory abilities.140 Specifically, the Board has the statutory and 
regulatory authority over nightclubs directly owned by the casino; however, 
                                                          
132 See Dreier, supra note 94; Powers, supra note 97. 
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LOFTUS FINAL FOR PRINT  (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2016  4:21 PM 
266 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:248 
this authority generally does not extend to venues operated by third parties.141 
To circumvent this limitation, the Board exerts control over third party vendors, 
such as nightclubs, through its control over the casino licensees.142 
i. Casino Liability for Third Party Non-Gaming Vendors 
The Board is an administrative agency that the Nevada Legislature has 
charged with the administration and enforcement of Nevada’s gaming laws as 
established in Nevada’s gaming statutes and in the regulations of the Nevada 
Gaming Commission (“Commission”).143 Generally, “the Board’s jurisdiction 
is limited to gaming licensees and therefore has no direct authority to regulate 
the conduct of non-gaming business operations”—third party vendors.144 
However, the Nevada Legislature has expanded the Board’s powers far beyond 
areas typically associated with the regulation of gaming and, thus, the Board 
indirectly has the authority to regulate third party vendors such as nightclubs.145 
Under Nevada’s gaming statutes, the Nevada Legislature has declared 
Nevada’s public policy concerning gaming as follows: 
The gaming industry is vitally important to the economy of [Nevada] and the 
general welfare of [Nevada’s] inhabitants. The continued growth and success 
of gaming is dependent upon public confidence and trust that licensed 
gaming . . . [establishments are] free from criminal and corruptive elements. 
Public confidence and trust can only be maintained by strict regulation of all 
persons, locations, practices, associations and activities related to the 
operation of licensed gaming establishments. . . .  All establishments where 
gaming is conducted and where gaming devices are operated . . . must 
therefore be licensed, controlled and assisted to protect the public health, 
safety, morals, good order and general welfare of the inhabitants of the State, 
to foster the stability and success of gaming and to preserve the competitive 
economy and policies of free competition of the State of Nevada.146 
Thus, through the Nevada Legislature’s broad mandate for the Board to 
protect the public health, safety, morals, good order, and general welfare of 
Nevada’s citizens at all establishments where gaming is conducted, the Board 
takes the position that gaming licensees and casinos are responsible for the 
                                                          
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Complaint at 1, State Gaming Control Bd. v. FP Holdings, L.P., NGC 12-07 
(Nev. Gaming Comm’n, Jan. 11, 2013), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/show 
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144 Dorn, supra note 19, at 38. 
145 Id. at 38–39. 
146 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0129 (2015). This stance is echoed in the Nevada 
Gaming Commission’s regulations. Operations of Gaming Establishments, Nev. 
Gaming Comm’n Reg. 5.010(1) (2015) (“It is the policy of the commission and the 
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operated in a manner suitable to protect the public health, safety, morals, good 
order and general welfare of the inhabitants of the State of Nevada.”). 
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conduct of third parties with operations on casino property.147 
The Board fortifies its stance that it has the authority to commence a 
disciplinary proceeding against a casino licensee for the conduct of a third party 
through the application of the Commission’s regulations.148 The Commission’s 
regulations, enforced by the Board, promulgate that any method of operation on 
behalf of the casino licensee that the Board deems “unsuitable will constitute 
grounds for license revocation or other disciplinary action.”149 In addition, the 
Commission’s regulations declare that the Board will administer disciplinary 
action against a casino licensee if the casino permits “any type of conduct in the 
gaming establishment which reflects or tends to reflect [negatively on the 
reputation] of the State of Nevada and act as a detriment to the gaming 
industry.150 Accordingly, with the threat of losing its invaluable gaming license 
due to the conduct of a third party vendor on the casino’s property that goes 
against Nevada’s public policies, a casino maintains the responsibility to 
regulate any illegal conduct that transpires on its property, regardless if the 
venue is managed by a third party. 
However, casinos, seeing a sharp increase in revenues related to the 
nightclub industry, did not take any corrective actions when drugs and 
prostitution became a semi-permanent fixture in the nightclub industry.151 
Thus, starting in 2006, the Board, through the use of “industry letters,” began 
notifying casino licensees about their responsibility for the third party vendors 
on their properties.152 
ii. Industry Letters 
Over the stretch of six years, the Board sent letters, and conducted 
awareness classes, to casino licensees regarding the illegal activities within 
nightclubs and informed the casino licensees about their responsibility under 
the Nevada Revised Statutes and Gaming Regulations for the conduct that 
transpired at these nightclub venues. 
On February 7, 2006, the Board sent a letter to casino licensees concerning 
                                                          
147 Dorn, supra note 19, at 38. 
148 Id. 
149 Reg. 5.010(2). 
150 Operations of Gaming Establishments, Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 5.011(10) 
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151 See infra Part II.B.4.. 
152 See infra Part II.C.2.ii. 
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the increasing problems related to nightclub activities.153 In its letter, the Board 
expressed concern about “incidences of excessive inebriation, drug distribution 
and abuse, violence, the involvement of minors, and the handling of those 
individuals who become incapacitated while at the club.”154 The Board 
concluded its letter by advising casino licensees that whether the nightclubs 
were owned by the casino or by third party vendors, the Board would hold the 
casino licensees accountable for any regulatory violations that occurred within 
or outside a nightclub located on the casino licensee’s property.155 
Thereafter, on April 9, 2009, in response to complaints about the conduct 
transpiring at the nightclubs, the Board sent casino licensees a reminder of the 
licensees’ responsibilities for the venues.156 In addition to the previous 
concerns addressed in the 2006 letter, the Board expanded the list of wrongful 
conduct to include: “excessive inebriation; drug distribution and abuse; 
violence; overt sexual acts in public areas; acts deemed lewd, indecent or 
obscene; presence of minors; mishandling of incapacitated individuals 
(“dumping”); date rape, extortion/misquoting of service charges; restricted 
access by law enforcement; lack of coordination with licensee security; and 
prostitution.”157 The Board also reaffirmed its stance that it is the Nevada 
casino “licensees’ responsibility to ensure operations conducted within the 
boundaries of their property are run in accordance with all laws and regulations 
and in a manner that does not reflect badly on the State of Nevada or its gaming 
industry.”158 
On April 9, 2012, the Board, in preparation for upcoming pool parties at 
day clubs, reached out to the casino licensees once again.159 The Board 
reviewed the illegal conduct that was taking place within the nightclubs and, 
once again, informed the casino licensees that “[r]egardless of the association 
or contractual agreement between the licensee, a lessee or a third party 
operator/manager; it remains the responsibility of the licensee to ensure 
operations conducted on its premises are run in accordance with all local, state 
and federal laws and gaming regulations.”160 
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Thus, the Board made it known to casino licensees that regardless of 
whether the nightclubs were owned and operated by the casino or by a third 
party vendor, the Board was going to hold casino responsible for the conduct 
that transpired in nightclubs that operated on casino premises. 
3. Casinos and Nightclubs Subjected to Board’s Oversight 
i. Planet Hollywood 
After the Board began issuing its industry letters, in 2009, it began 
investigating the activities that were occurring within Las Vegas nightclubs.161 
The Board set their sights on Prive, a popular nightclub that was located within 
the Planet Hollywood casino, after the Board received a letter from a former 
employee that stated the nightclub was involved in illegal narcotic and 
prostitution activities and was serving alcohol to underage girls.162 The Board’s 
investigations unveiled that big spenders were allowed to use drugs and 
participate in illegal sexual activities because of the money that they were 
spending in the club.163 Essentially, the more money a patron spent, the more 
illegal activity Prive’s management would allow. In fact, Prive’s management 
would prevent Prive’s security from removing cash-laden patrons regardless of 
whether the patrons were involved in illegal conduct.164 
“Allegations of underage drinking, drug use and prostitution are all part of 
the underground reputation of popular, big-city nightclubs—though former 
employees say Prive [was] unusual, even in the liberal nightclub world, 
because management cultivated such behavior.”165 Accordingly, in an 
unprecedented enforcement action against Planet Hollywood for allowing the 
Prive nightclub to run wild, the Board slapped the casino with a $500,000 
fine.166 The issue, especially after the multiple cautionary letters distributed by 
the Board, was that Planet Hollywood knew that Prive was conducting illegal 
activities and condoning behaviors that were against Nevada’s public policy, 
and yet allowed such conduct to continue.167 
In response to the Board’s regulatory actions, Prive temporarily closed its 
doors and Planet Hollywood held reform discussions with Prive’s 
management.168 As a result of what became referred to as “Prive-gate,” casinos 
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tightened their nightclub operations after realizing the Board meant to enforce 
its stance of holding casino licensees responsible for the illegal conduct that 
transpired within the clubs on their premises.169 
ii. Hard Rock and Palms 
In 2011, the Board went after the Hard Rock Hotel for drug sales and 
prostitution within its clubs.170 The Board, in sending another message to the 
industry about its stance of stamping out the illegal conduct in Las Vegas’ 
nightclubs, fined the Hard Rock $650,000.171 However, this message was short 
lived, as two years later, in 2013, the Board went after the Palms Casino for the 
same drug and prostitution issues.172 
The problem, as one commentator put it, is that 
“[i]t’s folly to think properties can stop customers from engaging in illicit sex 
and drug use when there’s no shortage of supply or demand for them. 
Prohibition didn’t stop alcohol use and gambling, and it won’t stop 
prostitution or drugs, either. But when the dealers and pimps are hotel 
employees, it crosses a line that threatens the reputation of the entire industry. 
Nevada worked hard for decades to rid its casinos of criminals and build its 
brand as an above-board, well-regulated destination for safe, lawful fun. Once 
the criminal element takes root within a hotel’s workforce, it inevitably 
spreads until it victimizes visitors . . . .”173 
iii. Mandalay Bay 
As if the multiple six figure fines were not enough to put the casino 
licensees on notice to monitor the illegal conduct within their nightclubs, in 
2014, the Board fined Mandalay Bay for Mandalay Bay’s problems of illicit 
drugs and prostitution its nightclubs venues.174 Specifically, the Board fined 
Mandalay Bay $500,000 after an investigation revealed that employees 
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provided drugs and prostitution services to undercover cops.175 Authorities say 
undercover officers bought cocaine, ecstasy and other drugs from employees of 
the House of Blues’ Foundation Room, which is located in the Mandalay Bay, 
over the summer of 2012.176 The Board’s partnership with local police was 
similar to the conduct of the sting against the Palms.177 
Thus, in viewing these examples of the Board’s recent regulatory actions, it 
is apparent that the Board has authority to conduct investigations into the illegal 
conduct that transpires within a casino licensees’ nightclub, even nightclubs of 
third party vendors, and hold the respective casino licensee responsible for any 
illegal conduct that transpires therein. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Nevada Supreme Court made it clear in Schlang, that in order to 
receive whistleblower protections under Nevada’s common law, the employee, 
among other elements, must affirmatively report her employer’s illegal conduct 
to a proper external authority, a government agency charged with regulating the 
respective illegal conduct. However, as the casino business model in Las Vegas 
has changed from that of gaming to that of an interdependent gaming and 
nightclub model, the Board has made it known through its industry letters as 
well as its enforcement actions that it has the power to regulate the ever-
popular nightclubs. However, although the Board can regulate the illegal 
conduct that transpires within the nightclubs, does the Board qualify under 
Schlang as a proper external agency for whistleblower protections if a 
nightclub employee reports her employer’s illegal conduct to the Board? 
The answer appears more certain for nightclubs that are owned directly by 
the casino licensees. Under the direct ownership model, the casino as a whole is 
under the Board’s oversight and, thus, the Board would be the agency that 
enforces any conduct that is violative of Nevada’s public policy. Accordingly, 
if an employee of a casino-owned nightclub notified the Board that the 
nightclub was participating in conduct that was violative of Nevada’s public 
policy, that employee would likely be protected under the Nevada’s common 
law whistleblower protections as the employee notified a proper external 
government agency. 
Nightclubs owned or operated by third party vendors, however, do not fall 
directly under the Board’s regulatory oversight. As addressed above, though, 
the Board indirectly regulates the activity that occurs within these nightclubs by 
holding the casino licensees responsible for the third party vendors. Here, 
unlike Schlang, where the employee reported the employer’s misconduct to a 
completely unrelated governmental agency that had no ability at all to act upon 
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the employee’s allegations, the Board, through broad mandates, has the ability 
to address conduct that is violative of Nevada’s public policies, even if the 
nightclub is owned by a third party vendor. Thus, if an employee of third party 
vendor reports her employer’s misconduct to the Board, the Nevada courts 
should consider her actions in line with Schlang and, therefore, she should be 
protected under Nevada’s common law whistleblower protections.   
 
